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Devolution and the Centre' 
Roger Masterman and James Mitchell 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the debate on devolution before the enactment of the various pieces 
of devolution legislation was parochial. It had been parochial in concentrat- 
ing on the opportunities, problems and implications of devolution within 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; little attention had been paid to devo- 
lution's impact on the UK as a whole or on the `centre' - Whitehall and 
Westminster. One of the paradoxes of devolution was that it had been framed 
in Scotland and Wales in nationalist terms, yet it was sold as a means of main- 
taining the Union. So long as devolution remained an opposition desire, the 
significance of its UK and particularly Whitehall implications could be 
ignored. Historically, much had been made by parliamentarians of the impli- 
cations for Westminster, or at least the House of Commons, of devolution - 
the West Lothian question - though there is little evidence that the English 
public found this important. Few seemed to know and fewer still cared that 
devolution would have an impact on Whitehall. Only a few academics, 
commentators and those working in Whitehall appreciated that this was an 
important matter. - 
It was against this background of lack of preparation that the Government 
legislated for devolution. The idea of a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) to 
bring the four governments together emerged late at night in a Government 
amendment in the House of Lords. Concordats between UK departments 
and the devolved administrations entered the vocabulary of British politics 
and became almost a panacea for the resolution of all kinds of disputes. The 
concordat became the shibboleth of devolutionists in much the same way that 
subsidiarity has for supporters of further European integration. 
Significantly, the emphasis was on formal institutions. Frequent refer- 
ences were made to the need for co-operation and, at least implicitly, a new, 
1 The research for this chapter forms part of the work undertaken on the `Devolution and the Centre' 
project funded by the ESRC Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme (reference no. 
L29252.026). The authors are grateful to John Rhodes for his work in carrying out the interviews for this 
project. 
2 For a prediction of the effects of devolution on Westminster and Whitehall see The Constitution 
Unit, 1996, pp. 99-119, or Hazell and Morris 1999. 
3 HL Deb. 28 July. col. 1487. 
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more pluralist political culture at the centre that would allow devolution to 
succeed, but these tended to be exhortations rather than detailed recommen- 
dations. There has been some evidence that a change in attitude has begun (or 
at least signals of that) but it remains too early to predict confidently that 
devolution signifies a shift in Whitehall culture. 
And while the devolved UK is repeatedly cited by UK ministers as 
evidence of a revitalised union, ' Whitehall remains inconspicuous. Despite 
its radical implications for the constitution - or at least for Whitehall 
devolution has evolved since its enactment in a pragmatic, evolutionary, 
even typically British manner. To date, devolution has not so much resulted 
in a revolution in Whitehall so much as Whitehall has adapted to accommo- 
date devolution. That may be testimony to the enduring strength and adapt- 
ability of the constitution or its innate conservatism. 
In their contribution to Constitutional Futures. A History of the Next Ten 
Years in 1999 Robert Hazell and Bob Morris suggested that devolution 
would result in a number of changes to the machinery at the centre of the UK 
Government, Whitehall: 
" the end of the territorial Secretaries of State; 
" the end of the unified home civil service; 
" the use of concordats and the development of legal and political structures 
of intergovernmental relations; 
" the use of the JMC on devolution as the main forum for the debate of devo- 
lution issues; 
" the establishment of devolution units within individual departments; 
" representation of the devolved administrations in London; and 
" representation for the devolved administrations to the European Union 
(EU). ` 
Of these predictions, only the less radical have so far come to fruition. 
Concordats have been agreed between Whitehall departments and the 
devolved administrations. The JMC on Devolution has acted as a forum for 
the discussion of various cross-border issues (although during the past year 
meetings have been infrequent). Whitehall departments have responded to 
devolution through the creation of devolution and nations and regions teams 
and the devolved administrations are beginning to make their presence felt 
on a European scale. However, the Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
Offices remain (albeit with roles that have changed since devolution) and the 
civil service remains unified within Great Britain. 
4 See for example: WO Press Release, 'Speech by the Secretary of State for Wales, Paul Murphy, to 
the Regional Government and Devolution Conference in Valencia, ' 31 October 2000, 'Cook says 
devolution will help ensure UK unity, ' The Herald, 20 April 2001; 'Liddell aims to build on 
Holyrood-Westminster links', The Herald, 8 May 2001. 
5 Hazell and Morris 1999, pp 136-155. 
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31 October 2000 
23 January 2001 
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23 March 2001 
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8 June 2001 
11 July 2001 
Figure 8.1. Key events in Whitehall: 2000-1 
Secretary of State for Wales Paul Murphy MP, addresses 
Regional Government and Devolution Conference in 
Valencia. 
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Resignation of Peter Mandelson MP from post of Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland. 
Appointment of Dr John Reid MP as Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland and appointment of Helen Liddell MP as 
Secretary of State for Scotland. 
Resignation of Frank Roy MP as PPS to Helen Liddell, to be 
replaced by Jim Murphy MP. 
DGN 9 (Post-Devolution Primary Legislation Affecting 
Wales) published. 
DGN 5 (The Role of the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland Post-Devolution) published. 
William Hague MP announces that an incoming 
Conservative government would retain the post of Secretary 
of State for Scotland. 
Prime Minister Blair tells press of mistakes made by `not 
letting go' of affairs in Wales, post-devolution. 
Revised edition of DGN 6 (Circulation of Inter-Ministerial 
and Inter-Departmental Correspondence) published. 
Robin Cook MP, Foreign Secretary, announces that 
devolution will 'stand the test of time as one of this 
Government's most radical achievements. ' 
Children's Commissioner for Wales Act receives Royal 
Assent. 
Labour win the UK general election, confirming second term 
in office with another landslide victory. 
Reshuffle of Cabinet, with new responsibilities for the 
Deputy Prime Minister and departments responsible for the 
English regions. 
Cabinet Office press release outlines the structure and 
responsibilities of the new Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
These expectations were based on an appreciation of administrative 
processes - Hazell and Morris had avoided emphasising the party-political 
implications. All things being equal, these expectations were logical. We 
may surmise that one reason for the limited, indeed relatively conservative, 
nature of the changes that have been brought about has been the party politi- 
cal considerations that tend to be of particular importance in an election year. 
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However, had this been entirely correct, we might have expected the Blair 
government, re-elected with a huge majority, to use the opportunity of a 
post-election situation to press ahead with the more radical, and potentially 
politically sensitive, ideas. Instead, there has been little evidence of this. This 
appears to reflect a mixture of constitutional conservatism on the part of the 
government and party political considerations that pre-election had resulted 
in the government making commitments that have bound it even after it 
secured its second term. 
As well as drawing on official documents and the published secondary 
literature, this chapter is based on interviews with over 40 UK government 
officials carried out in the spring and summer of 2001 for the `Devolution 
and Whitehall' project being undertaken by the authors and Professor Robert 
Hazell at the Constitution Unit, which forms part of the ESRC's Devolution 
and Constitutional Change programme. It will examine how the centre has 
responded to devolution, dealing specifically with the courts, the impact of 
devolution on Whitehall departments and the territorial offices, and the 
changes to the central machinery of government made in June 2001 that will 
shape the way central government deals with devolution in the future. 
DEVOLUTION AND THE COURTS 
When preparations were being made for devolution, many observers 
expected that it would result in a great deal of work for lawyers. Even if the 
four governments avoided their differences becoming legal disputes, there 
was plenty of scope for challenges by third parties to the actions of the 
devolved institutions, questioning the extent of the bodies' statutory powers. 
To deal with such challenges each of the devolution Acts contains a schedule 
setting out a detailed procedure for dealing with 'devolution issues', which 
are largely issues of whether an Act or piece of secondary legislation is 
within the competence of that particular devolved institution. ' Such issues 
are to be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the law 
officers of the UK government and devolved administrations may be heard in 
the legal proceedings on them. The legal effect of giving such powers to the 
Judicial Committee (rather than to the House of Lords' Appellate Commit- 
tee) has itself been the subject of some discussion, as it creates a `dual apex' 
in the UK's judicial system. ' It also means that a UK court sitting in London 
has become, in practice, the final court of appeal for certain Scottish criminal 
matters. 
What has been striking, however, is the little use that has in fact been made 
in the first two years of devolution of the `devolution issues' procedure. For 
6 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 6; Government of Wales Act 1998, Schedule 8; Northern Ireland Act 
1998, Schedule 10. For a discussion, see Burrows 2000, chap. 6. 
7 See Le Sueur and Comes 2001, especially chaps. 2 and 5. 
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government lawyers advising on the powers of the devolved administrations 
and assemblies there may be a good deal of devolution-related work, but few 
other lawyers have been greatly affected. While the procedure has been used 
in a number of cases (three in 2000, and four to 31 July 2001), with one 
exception these have all concerned criminal prosecutions brought in Scot- 
land. The challenges have been brought on the ground that the prosecution is 
contrary to the defendant's human rights protected under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and section 57 (2) of the Scotland Act 1998. The last year has 
however seen the first exception to that, in the case of Anderson, Reid & 
Doherty v Scottish Ministers and Advocate-General. for Scotland. This case 
challenges the lawfulness of the first Act passed by the Scottish Parliament, 
the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999, which 
provides for the continued incarceration of prisoners suffering from untreat- 
able personality disorders (notably psychopathic disorders) as well as mental 
illness. This case, like previous challenges, is based on human rights grounds 
(Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights), and the Court of 
Session had little difficulty in dismissing the application when it was heard in 
May-June 2000.9 The case came before the Judicial Committee in July 2001 
but no judgment had been issued before the court rose for the summer. 
Such legal challenges to the legislation and other decisions taken by the 
devolved institutions are likely to become more common over time. While 
Scotland will probably remain the principal object of such challenges, Wales 
and Northern Ireland are unlikely to be wholly immune. Whether the `judi- 
cial architecture' of the UK will be adequate to cope with them is doubtful 
and has already, for example, been questioned by the UK's Senior Law Lord, 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill. "' Already, however, the role of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council is exciting some discussion in Scotland. " 
The supremacy of the Scottish High Court of Justiciary as the final court of 
appeal for Scottish criminal matters was carefully preserved under the Union 
with England of 1707. It has therefore come as quite a surprise to find that 
jurisdiction has in fact passed to a UK court, and doubly so that this is a 
consequence of devolution. This is aggravated by the detailed aspects of 
Scottish criminal law and procedure that have been the subject of appeals to 
the Judicial Committee, and by the apparent ignorance of Scottish law and 
procedure exhibited in those judgments. This legal intervention has proved a 
R This prohibits a member of the Scottish Executive. including the Lord Advocate, from doing an 
act that is incompatible with Convention rights. See also sections 29 and 54 of the Scotland Act 1998, 
the former stating that all provisions of Acts of the Scottish Parliament are beyond the Parliament's 
legislative competence to the extent they are incompatible with Convention rights, and the latter 
providing that secondary legislation made by Scottish ministers is not competent to the extent it is 
incompatible with Convention rights. 
9 [2001 J SC 1,16 June 2001. The Court consisted of the Lord President, Lady Cosgrove and Lord 
Philip. 
10 See The Supreme Sacrifice'. The Times, 17 July 2001. 
11 See Le Sueur 2001 and Le Sueur and Comes 2001. 
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particular source of concern to those who expected that the requirement to 
act only in accordance with human rights obligations would prove a rather 
remote restriction rather than an immediate and tangible constraint. 
THE IMPACT OF DEVOLUTION ON WHITEHALL 
With a cross-departmental emphasis on good practice and establishing sensi- 
ble working arrangements with the devolved administrations the Whitehall 
response to devolution throughout 2000-2001 can clearly be termed prag- 
matic. The terminology of concordats and Devolution Guidance Notes 
(DGNs) has permeated every level of central government, ensuring that, for 
the most part, change has been in a practical rather than organisational 
sense. '2 Whitehall departments have responded to devolution by raising 
awareness and ensuring that the language of devolution was instilled in deci- 
sion-making processes. " However, in keeping with the fragmented structure 
of UK central government, each department determined for itself what 
approach it should adopt. 14 
The establishment of `devolution units' provides a practical example. The 
function of these generally small teams has been to provide information and 
increase familiarity with the complex and asymmetric distribution of powers 
following devolution within the department. Examples include the Interna- 
tional and Constitution Branch in the Department of Health and the Regional 
Co-ordination and Devolution Directorate in the Department of Transport, 
Local Government and the Regions (DTLR). Such teams have, however, 
been largely reserved to the main departments providing front-line services, 
and accordingly the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport do not have in-house devolution expertise. One exception 
was the devolution team in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (although 
it has been wound down during the year). A particularly good example 
remains the DTLR's Regional Co-ordination and Devolution Directorate, 
originally established during the passage through Westminster of the three 
devolution Acts of 1998. Whitehall officials consider that such groups 
remain necessary, two years after the devolved administrations were estab- 
lished, due to continued questions over the division of powers between 
administrations caused by changes in policy, new legislation, and most 
recently the changes to departmental remits following the 2001 UK general 
election (discussed in more detail below). 's 
12 The increase in use of the terminology of devolution has been seen in House of Commons 
debates. A basic search for 'concordat' in 1994 comes up with no hits, five for 1995,20 for 1996.63 for 
1997,329 for 1998,400 for 1999, down to 248 for 2000 and 493 by end of June 2001. 
13 Interviews with Whitehall officials, March-July 2001. 
14 See Daintith and Page 1999, chaps. 2 and 10. 
15 Interview with Whitehall official. July 2001. 
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A number of departments had the benefit of retaining the majority of their 
pre-devolution functions. The Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE) did not cede any functions to the devolved administrations (the 
Welsh and Scottish Offices already dealt with education matters in those 
countries) and so relationships, originally established with officials in the 
three territorial departments, could carry on much as they were with the three 
devolved administrations. And yet although the role of the department and its 
Secretary of State remained virtually unchanged, DfEE was initially slow to 
respond to the demands of liaising with the separate administrations. 16 
Within the department the view that the effects of devolution would be mini- 
mal made it hard to generate interest in looking at the impact of devolution. 
Interest was quickly stimulated, however, by the announcement of the Scot- 
tish Executive's policy divergence from Whitehall over university tuition 
fees. While this triggered a change in approach this lay in practice rather than 
organisation, and it fell to the department's strategy division to raise aware- 
ness of the new settlement and its intricacies throughout the department. " 
Other departments were perhaps not as fortunate and found that their 
responsibilities had narrowed on some levels while remaining static on 
others; where potential problems arose, it was in the interaction between 
levels. For example, while parts of DTLR transport policy remain a UK-wide 
responsibility (vehicle standards and emissions), others stretch only as far as 
Great Britain (licensing, roadworthiness and insurance), while others have 
been narrowed yet further to apply to England alone (roads policy). Mapping 
the scope of a UK department's responsibilities in this way is complex for the 
observer and no doubt confusing for many civil servants. Officials report that 
in dealing with the interaction between these policies in a pragmatic way, and 
in close co-operation with the devolved administrations, disputes over compe- 
tences have been identified and resolved before becoming problematic. And 
while some departments may have been slower than others to catch on, the 
consensus is that interaction between departments, the territorial offices and 
the devolved administrations now comes as second nature when necessary. 
The emphasis on partnership, emphasised through ministerial rhetoric and 
put into practice at the official level, has ensured that potential problems over 
policy divergence between administrations, the future of the unified civil 
service and claims of Whitehall control-freakery have, thus far, been largely 
diverted (see also Chapter 7). 
THE WORK OF THE TERRITORIAL OFFICES 
The three territorial offices - the Scotland Office (SO), Wales Office (WO) 
and Northern Ireland Office (NIO) - retain a key role even after devolution. 
lb Interview with Whitehall official. April 2001. 
Interviews with Whitehall officials. April-Mav 2001. 
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They link the devolved administrations with the UK government, and their 
Secretary of State acts as advocate for that territory within the UK Govern- 
ment. The NIO retains other functions as well, notably regarding security and 
policing, and the Northern Ireland Secretary also has the power to suspend 
devolution under the Northern Ireland Act 2000. What the territorial offices 
continue to do in post-devolution Whitehall is worth investigating in detail. 
The Scotland Office 
The Scotland Office departmental report 2001 detailed the role of the office: 
" to promote the devolution settlement for Scotland; 
" to continue to represent Scottish interests within the UK government on 
matters reserved to the UK Parliament; 
" to exercise certain residual functions in reserved areas, notably under the 
Scotland Act 1998, but also in relation to elections and private legislation; 
" to pay grant to the Scottish Consolidated Fund; 
" to provide legal advice and services to the UK government as regards 
Scots law. " 
Its functions are therefore representative (both of Scotland to the UK 
Government, and vice versa), administrative (paying grant, advising on 
Scots law) and executive (to only a limited degree, for reserved matters). The 
SO is currently split into four divisions: the Parliamentary and Constitution 
Division, the Economy and Industry Division, the Social and Home Affairs 
Division, and the Finance and Administration Unit. The latter three are based 
in Edinburgh and Glasgow, with only the Parliamentary and Constitution 
Division residing south of the border, at Dover House in Whitehall. 
A good deal of the work of the SO has centred around acting as an inter- 
face between Whitehall departments and the Scottish Executive. Areas of 
potential conflict or tension have been referred to the SO and its Secretary of 
State, allowing the stability of the settlement to be monitored and minimising 
accusations of `control freakery' being levelled at Whitehall departments. '9 
The SO has also performed a monitoring role - scrutinising legislative 
proposals from both Westminster and Holyrood in an attempt to identify 
clashes of competence. The SO and Office of the Advocate General have 
worked in tandem on this exercise, with over 40 of the SO's 100 or so staff 
having legal expertise. 20 In parallel with this the 2001 departmental report 
listed eleven Orders in Council passed under the Scotland Act 1998 between 
April 2000 and March 2001 for the purposes of `fine-tuning' the devolution 
settlement. 2' As of September 2001 another seven Orders in Council have 
18 SO 2001, Cm 5120, p6. 
19 Interview with Whitehall official, July 2001. 
20 Interview with Whitehall official, July 2001. 
21 SO 2001, CM 5120, at Annex 10 (Scotland Act Orders Made 2000-2001). 
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been added to this list, with a further Transfer of Functions Order to be made 
by the Privy Council in October 2001. The process of monitoring the legisla- 
tive competence of the Scottish Parliament and making amendments to the 
devolution arrangements through Orders in Council has constituted a large 
part of the work of the SO since devolution. '` 
The SO retains a role in developing UK policy in relation to reserved 
matters. Incidences of the involvement of the SO include the Scottish econ- 
omy, ` the promotion of overseas trade interests, and government decisions 
affecting the oil and gas industry in Scotland. ` The departmental report 2001 
addresses these matters in the language of co-operation and partnership 
favoured by many of the Whitehall documents on devolution: 
Good working relations have been established with the Scottish Executive and 
relevant Whitehall Departments with responsibility for reserved matters, which 
has been important to enable Scottish Ministers effectively to present UK policies 
in Scotland. 
In his role as Secretary of State for Scotland John Reid was being increas- 
ingly seen as `a government trouble shooter and much has been made of 
his `expansionist' view of the post, leading to friction with the then Scottish 
First Minister, Donald Dewar. 2' (It is notable how the staffing of the SO grew 
while he was Secretary of State. ) But his work in and for the SO has also been 
portrayed in a favourable light, for example by Donald Macintyre of The 
Independent: `Reid's strategic achievement in Scotland has been to give the 
Scotland Office, denuded of actual power, the authority it has. '=' 
Figure 8.2. Ministers in the Scotland Office, at July 2001 
Helen Liddell Secretary of State for 
Scotland 
Appointed January 2001 
George Foulkes Minister of State for Scotland Appointed January 2001 
Jim Murphy PPS Appointed February 
2001 
Sandra Osborne PPS Appointed January 2001 
Lynda Clark QC Advocate General Appointed May 1999 
22 Interview with Whitehall official. July 2001. 
-'i Including the designation of assisted areas and regulation of the energy and financial services 
sectors in Scotland (for further details see SO 2001, p2). 
24 Ibid, pp. 2-3. 
5 `Reid takes over Ulster role', The Times, 25 January 2001. 
26 Hazell 2001, p 15. 
27 `The Blairite bruiser', The Independent, 27 January 2001. 
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Helen Liddell was elevated to the post of Secretary of State for Scotland 
on 24 January 2001, following Reid's departure to the NIO. Liddell was 
previously minister for Energy at the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), and between 1995 and 1997 was the junior opposition spokeswoman 
on Scotland. Reid had established a role for himself when Donald Dewar had 
been First Minister. This, allied with the fact that Henry McLeish is a much 
weaker First Minister, eased the task for Liddell on her appointment as 
Secretary of State for Scotland (see also Chapter 3). 
The Wales Office 
The role of the WO post-devolution is to ` ... support the 
Secretary of State 
in his role of representing Wales in the UK government, representing the UK 
government in Wales, and ensuring the smooth working of the devolution 
settlement for Wales. Q8 In line with this role the WO's departmental report 
2001 lays down the office's objectives as follows: 
" to maintain effective working relationships with the Assembly and to 
ensure that the devolution settlement continues to operate equitably in the 
best interests of Wales; 
" to ensure that the interests of Wales are fully taken into account in primary 
legislation which affects the Assembly's responsibilities; 
" to promote Welsh interests in functions retained by the UK Government; 
" to promote effective communication and co-ordination of policy in areas 
which straddle the boundary between transferred and retained functions; 
" to keep under review the operation of the funding policy for the devolved 
administrations. 29 
Again, the roles are representative, administrative and executive. The 
representative function is rather different, however, given the nature of the 
Welsh settlement. As Welsh primary legislation has to be made at Westmin- 
ster, the task of liaising between the UK department on one hand and the 
National Assembly on the other, and understanding the Welsh settlement 
from a UK government point of view, falls to the WO. The principles govern- 
ing the process are laid down in DGN 9, issued in February 2001 after 
protracted discussions between the WO, Cabinet Office and National 
Assembly. (See Chapter 7 for further discussion of the legislative process 
affecting Wales, and Chapter 9 for discussion of how Westminster legislation 
has dealt with Welsh issues. ) 
One obligation is for the Secretary of State for Wales, Paul Murphy MP, to 
attend a debate at the National Assembly on the Queen's Speech and the UK 
government's legislative programme and on 18 December 2000 he duly 
attended at the National Assembly. And 2000-1 saw a major legislative 
28 WO 2001, Cm5121, p6. 29 Ibid. 
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achievement, which had involved much work for the WO. Following the 
publication of the report of the Waterhouse Inquiry into abuse of children in 
care in north Wales, close co-operation between the WO, the UK Department 
of Health and the National Assembly had already allowed the creation of a 
Children's Commissioner for Wales in Part V of the Care Standards Act 
2000. The powers of the Commissioner were greatly extended in the 
Children's Commissioner for Wales Bill, the first Wales-only legislation to 
be proposed at Westminster following devolution, which gained Royal 
Assent on 11 May 2001 after an uncontroversial passage through both 
Houses of Parliament. 
The 2000-2001 Parliamentary session saw other legislation similarly 
involving consultation with the WO - such as the Local Government Act 
2000, the Transport Act 2000 or the Learning and Skills Act 2000. In addi- 
tion the WO has been active in developing Welsh interests in reserved 
matters; in 2000-1 this particularly involved Home Office and Treasury 
responsibilities. i0 
Figure 8.3. Ministers in the Wales Office, at July 2001 
Paul Murphy Secretary of State for Wales Appointed July 1999 
Don Touhig Parliamentary Under-Secretary Appointed June 2001 
The Northern Ireland Office 
Following the resignation of Peter Mandelson from the post of Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland in January 2001, John Reid was appointed to 
succeed him. Under the Blair administration Reid had served as a junior 
minister at the Ministry of Defence, and as Minister for Transport. From 
1999 he was Secretary of State for Scotland. Given the sensitivities of North- 
ern Ireland it is also significant that Reid is a Catholic. 
Figure 8.4. Ministers in the Northern Ireland Office, at July 2001 
John Reid Secretary of State for Appointed Jan. 2001 
Northern Ireland 
Jane Kennedy Minister of State Appointed June 2001 
Des Browne 
, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary Appointed June 2001 
Despite the inevitable `stop-start' nature of devolution to Northern Ireland 
thus far, as a result of both the suspension of the devolved institutions 
;° WO departmental report 2001, pp. 7-8. Particular interest has been paid by the WO to crime and 
policing in Wales. In addition the WO has established regular contact with the Treasury's Devolved 
Countries and Regions Team. 
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between February and May 2000 and the replacement of Peter Mandelson by 
John Reid as Secretary of State in January 2001, the NIO has maintained a 
commitment towards making devolution work. This commitment is perhaps 
best illustrated by the self-denying ordinance against initiating new policy 
from the centre imposed by NIO ministers during the 2000 suspension. Of 
course, the extra dimension imposed by the Belfast Agreement adds to the 
responsibilities of the NIO; the NIO has to ensure that the political conditions 
enable the peace process to continue, with the eventual goal being a second 
stage of devolution to Northern Ireland. 31 
The retention of responsibility for law and order and security functions 
ensures that the role of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland bears a 
heavier policy burden than the equivalent post in the Scotland and Wales 
Offices and that the NIO retains an active role in the administration of the 
province. For as long as policing, criminal justice and prisons lie within the 
remit of the NIO there is little chance that the department will be signifi- 
cantly reduced in size or even significantly reformed in the near future. This 
wider jurisdiction is reflected in the aim of the NIO, as set down in the 
departmental report 2001: 
To secure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland, based on the Good Friday 
Agreement, in which the rights and identities of all traditions in Northern Ireland 
are fully respected and safeguarded and in which a safe, stable, just, open and 
tolerant society can thrive and prosper. 3= 
In contrast to the other territorial departments, ensuring the smooth operation 
of the devolution settlement is one of many responsibilities for the NIO. In 
March 2001 relationships between the NIO, Whitehall departments and the 
Northern Ireland administration were described as `positive and construc- 
tive. '33 And in these fields significant steps have been made; following the 
recommendations of the Patten Report, the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 
received Royal Assent on 23 November 2000, the Office of the Police 
Ombudsman was opened in November 2000 and, perhaps most symbolically, 
the Maze Prison was closed in September 2000, following the continued 
release of prisoners under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. It was 
these responsibilities that were to largely exclude the NIO from the debate 
over the future role of the territorial Secretaries of State throughout 
2000-2001. 
The Continuing Roles of the Territorial Secretaries of State 
Much of the debate surrounding the machinery of government prior to the 
2001 UK general election concerned the future of the territorial Secretaries 
31 DGN 5 (The Role of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) recognises the commitment 
towards further devolution to Northern Ireland. 
32 Northern Ireland Office 2001, Cm 5122, p8. 
33 Ibid. o9. 
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of State. Indeed within Whitehall (and outside it) views on the future of the 
offices were polarised, especially with regard to the role of the Secretary of 
State for Scotland; most civil servants agreed that the office `brought value' 
to the devolution settlement, and provided an avenue into Whitehall business 
for the Scottish administration, but a vocal minority insisted that post-devo- 
lution a separate department of state for Scotland simply could not be justi- 
fied. 34 
Since the transfer of powers from the old Scottish Office to the Executive 
in Edinburgh it has been alleged that it is becoming increasingly unclear 
what the actual role of the Scottish Secretary is. 35 The official position is that 
the Secretary of State remains to ensure the smooth implementation of the 
devolution arrangements and to oversee relations between Whitehall and 
Holyrood, and yet since devolution the office has undergone a more 
profound change. One of us has suggested that during the tenure of John Reid 
the office became the post of `Minister for Spin' due to having more time on 
his hands than fellow cabinet members as a result of a lighter policy burden. 36 
These claims were countered by Helen Liddell who asserted that in her first 
seven weeks in the job she had been `run ragged. '' When the issue was 
raised at Westminster by the Conservative MP James Gray in a written ques- 
tion, he received a rather terse response: 
Mr Gram: To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what discussions she has 
had with the Prime Minister concerning the future of her department. 
Mrs. Liddell: I have regular discussions with the Prime Minister on a wide range 
of issues... ;x 
Of the three territorial Secretaries of State, the office of Secretary of State 
for Scotland remains the most obvious candidate for reform. With the 
demands of the ongoing peace process in Ireland it would be almost impossi- 
ble to alter the position of the NIO. While the Welsh Secretary has to repre- 
sent the interests of the National Assembly in the legislative process at 
Westminster, the office of Scottish Secretary seems prima facie the most 
redundant. Various suggestions for change were tabled in the run-up to the 
general election, amid speculation that this was where Blair - notoriously 
reluctant to tamper with the organisation of Whitehall - would choose to 
cut. Robert Hazell's argument was that a 'Secretary of State for the Union' 
could: 
... take a more strategic and 
forward looking view, and lead government thinking 
on the unresolved issues of devolution: finance, representation at Westminster 
34 Interviews with Whitehall officials, May and July 2001. See also Hazell, 2001. p 14. 
See Parry and Jones 2000, and James Mitchell. 'Tell us again, what does the Scottish Secretary 
The Sunday Times (Scotland edition), 28 January 2001. 
;6 Ibid. 
37 `Liddell `run ragged' as Scottish Secretary', The Herald, 20 March 2001. 
`K House of Commons Written Answers. 3 Anril 2001, Column 169W. 
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and the English Question. A combined Secretary of State could also help to ensure 
mutual learning between the devolved administrations and the UK government 
from the policy experiments released by devolution. " 
This was echoed publicly by one other think-tank. 40 The debate surfaced in 
the media, with reports in the run-up to the UK general election that this 
would happen. ' The Tories picked up on the issue too; writing in Scotland on 
Sunday, William Hague, then Leader of the Opposition but using terms that 
have become familiar through their use by government ministers, outlined 
the Conservative Party's plans to `strengthen the Union and improve the 
government of Scotland. '42 Hague argued that to ensure a strong voice for 
Scotland at Westminster and in Europe it would be necessary to retain the 
post of Secretary of State for Scotland. Labelling any plans to remove, or 
merge, the offices `a serious mistake', Hague proposed an increased UK role 
in Cabinet for the Secretary of State for Scotland allowing the post holder to 
lead UK delegations at an international level. (It was generally not noticed 
that Hague planned to combine the office with another Cabinet post, as part 
of his plans to reduce the overall size of the Cabinet; in reality the SO would 
have become an appendage to a larger Whitehall department. ) 
Despite the suggestion that the SO bears a lighter policy load than prior to 
devolution, the staff of the SO has increased to 107. The WO too has six more 
staff in April 2001 than it did the previous year, taking its total number up to 
46, while the total staff of the NIO has remained static, at 190. 
Figure 8.5. Staff of the territorial offices 43 
Northern Ireland 
Office 
Scotland Office Wales Office 
April 2000 190 86 40 
April 2001 190 107 46 
What do all these people in the SO do? The role of the SO post-devolution 
is clearly limited. While Westminster legislation has turned out to be more 
complex than was expected before devolution (see Chapter 9), the bulk of 
that work falls on the WO rather than the SO. The SO's functions are 
39 Hazell 2001, p5. 
40 See, for example, Hunt, `Remodelling Government', IPPR, summarised in The Times, 16 
December 2000. 
4i See `Blair plans Ministry of Justice in big shake-up of Whitehall, ' The Independent, 20 March 
2001; `Downing St studies ways to reshuffle ministry pack, ' Financial Times, 12 March 2001. There 
have, however, also been reports that the Government's plan to create a Secretary of State for the Union 
had been `shelved for the foreseeable future', see for example `Scotland Minister "has no job to do"'. 
The Herald, 19 March 2001. 
42 `Play the Scottish Card', Scotland on Sunday, 4 March 2001. 
43 Sources: SO, 2000,2001; WO 2000,2001; figures for the N1O were taken from Civil Service 
Staffing Statistics, available at www. cabinet-office. gov. uk/civilservice/index/statistics. htm as no 
comparable figures were contained in the NIO departmental reports. 
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comparatively limited. One suggestion is that the size of the office was due to 
empire building by Reid; this is rejected by officials, but a public case why 
the office needs to be so large has still not been made. 
GOVERNMENT AT THE CENTRE 
At the heart of central government lies a small network of officials charged 
with making sure the whole machine works. For present purposes `the 
centre' is treated as the central departments of state - not just the Cabinet 
Office, and the network surrounding the Prime Minister at 10 Downing 
Street, but also HM Treasury. However, Number 10 plays only a limited 
day-to-day role in devolution, and is mainly concerned with aspects of inter- 
governmental relations. The Treasury too has scaled down its involvement 
with devolution matters, having only a relatively small team dealing with 
devolution. The Cabinet Office is, however, a prominent player, not just at 
the interface with the devolved administrations but also acting as a resource 
for other Whitehall departments. 
HM Treasury 
At first glance it appears that the Treasury plays a central part in devolution. 
In contrast to the legal arrangements, finance remains heavily centralised. 
Funding is allocated to the devolved administrations according to the Barnett 
Formula (discussed in detail in Chapter 6), by the UK Government which 
continues to have sole responsibility in this area. However, the Barnett 
Formula is simple to administer even if it is complex in its working and 
effects. The Treasury does have a devolved countries and regions team, but 
this is small (nine officials). As Chapter 7 discusses, the role of the Treasury 
in dealing with the devolved administrations is relatively limited - certainly 
nothing like the detailed control of spending that UK departments face 
through departmental expenditure controllers. 44 When settlements are rela- 
tively generous to the devolved administrations (as with Wales and the fund- 
ing for Objective 1 in the 2000 Comprehensive Spending Review; see 
Chapter 6), that happens for political reasons rather than administrative ones. 
Officials are of course adamant that the Barnett Formula is not open for 
review or even discussion. While finance remains centralised at the UK 
level, and for all the power of the Treasury in finance matters, at an adminis- 
trative level the Treasury is not in fact an active player in devolution. 
Cabinet Office: The Constitution Secretariat 
Various arms of the Cabinet Office are and have been involved in the 
management of devolution. Two of the most notable examples are the 
44 See Thain and Wright 1995. 
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Central Secretariat, with responsibility for civil service staffing, and the 
European Secretariat, which carries responsibility for EU matters. The most 
prominent however, has been the Constitution Secretariat. 
The Constitution Secretariat was established following the 1997 general 
election to manage the incoming Labour government's extensive constitu- 
tional reform agenda. It was placed at the focal point of the Whitehall 
machinery dealing with devolution. The Secretariat forged close contacts 
with the central co-ordination units in each of the devolved administrations, 
encouraged bilateral contact between departments and the devolved admin- 
istrations, and rightly saw devolution as a process, not an event. 45 The 
Constitution Secretariat's website detailed its role as: 
" to work alongside departments with lead responsibility for each element of 
the Government's constitutional reform programme; 
" to service the collective decision-making necessary to deliver the Govern- 
ment's objectives; 
" to undertake a co-ordinating role in bringing together interested depart- 
ments and ensuring cohesion across the programme as a whole; 
" to act as the secretariat to the Joint Ministerial Committee on Devolution 
(JMC); and 
" to act as the secretariat for the British-Irish Council (BIC). 46 
Co-ordinating the government's constitutional agenda across Whitehall was 
undeniably necessary, but was in practice more concerned with raising 
awareness and managing relationships than the implementation of policy. 
But the additional brokering role with the devolved administrations (see 
Chapter 7), provided an essential means by which potential disputes could be 
identified and dealt with without resort to the formal machinery set up under 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 47 Although prior to devolution, 
officials at the centre believed that the co-ordination mechanisms set up 
under the MOU would be regularly invoked to deal with potentially diver- 
gent policy positions between the administrations, this has not been the case. 
The success of the Constitution Secretariat in this management role can be 
attributed to various factors: 
" the simple fact that prior to devolution there were no explicit supervisors 
of relations between Whitehall departments and the territorial offices; 48 
" consultation between UK departments and the devolved administrations 
has been encouraged, and has continued between individuals with estab- 
lished working relationships; 
45 Interview with Whitehall Official, May 2001. 
46 www. cabinet-office. gov. uk/constitution/index. htm (visited June 2001). 
47 Cabinet Office 2000, Cm. 4806. 
48 Interview with Whitehall official. March 2001. 
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" the devolved administrations have regularly attended meetings in White- 
hall and received papers. 49 
Despite the practical change which devolution has effected in Whitehall, the 
reality of the progression has been one of evolution rather than revolution. " 
Indeed those at the centre remain relaxed about the potential discord which 
many have predicted will result in the event of a devolved nationalist admin- 
istration, believing that good working relations at official level can minimise 
tensions. With the emphasis during 2000-2001 on maintaining working rela- 
tionships and putting into practice the principles enshrined in the MOU and 
accompanying concordats, many officials believe that the desire of politi- 
cians to provide `good service', reinforced by established working practices, 
will enable relations between the four administrations to continue much as 
they do at presents' 
The Mechanics of Devolution: Devolution Guidance Notes 
Adding to the values of co-operation and consultation inherent in the MOU 
the Constitution Secretariat has continued to produce DGNs throughout 
2000-2001.52 Though formally only guidance to Whitehall departments and 
their officials about how to deal with devolution matters, DGNs are as a 
matter of practice drafted in conjunction with the devolved administrations 
affected and so represent agreed positions about detailed matters of adminis- 
tration. That means they are particularly useful to outside observers as a 
guide to how devolution is supposed to work from day to day. 53 A full list is 
reproduced below. " 
By the end of July 2001 the only DGN which remained unpublished was 
DGN 7 (Court Proceedings regarding Devolution Issues under the Scotland 
Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998). This is perhaps surprising 
bearing in mind the amount of litigation already heard by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council under the Scotland Act 1998, and now the 
first challenge to Scottish legislation has been heard, the Government's 
seeming lack of progress on this front is perplexing. 55 
Some of the recent DGNs are worth noting. DGN 9, Post-Devolution 
Primary Legislation Affecting Wales, agreed between the UK government 
49 Interview with Whitehall official, June 2001. 
50 Interview with Whitehall official. May 2001. 
51 Interview with Whitehall Official, May 2001. 
52 For details of previous DGNs published see Hazell, 2000, pp. 161-163. 
5; To this extent DGNs can be said, like concordats, to function as `soft law' - see Rawlings 2000. 
54 All DGNs are available on the Cabinet Office website at www. cabinet-office. gov. uk 
Constitution/devolution/guidance, 'dgn. index. htm 
55 For further details of the case see the August 2001 Devolution and the Centre Monitoring Report 
available on the Constitution Unit website (www. ucl. ac. uk-constitution-unit'). For further details of the 
cases involving devolution issues heard by the Judicial Committee see Le Sueur and Comes. 2001. 
pp. 22-24. 
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Figure 8.6. Devolution Guidance Notes published at August 2001 
DGNI Common Working Arrangements (21 January 2000) 
DGN2 Handling Correspondence under Devolution (21 January 2000) 
DGN3 Role of the Secretary of State for Scotland (21 January 2000) 
DGN4 Role of the Secretary of State for Wales (21 January 2000) 
DGN5 Role of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
(27 February 2001) 
DGN6 Circulation of Inter-Ministerial and Interdepartmental 
Correspondence (Revised 23 March 2001). 
DGN7 Court Proceedings regarding Devolution Issues under the 
Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998 
(to be published) 
DGN8 Post Devolution Primary Legislation affecting Northern Ireland 
(Published April 2001) 
DGN9 Post Devolution Primary Legislation affecting Wales 
(27 February 2001) 
DGN 10 Post Devolution Primary Legislation affecting Scotland 
(21 January 2000) 
DGN11 Ministerial Accountability after Devolution (28 July 2000) 
DGN12 Attendance of UK Ministers and Officials at Committees of the 
Devolved Legislatures (30 March 2000) 
DGN13 Handling of Parliamentary Business in the House of Lords 
(30 March 2000) 
and the Cabinet of the National Assembly, sets down guidance to be followed 
by Whitehall departments when dealing with legislation affecting the 
Assembly's responsibilities. Like other DGNs, the document encourages 
interaction between administrations from an early stage. Although it notes 
that policy control remains with the UK government, it outlines that the 
Cabinet of the Assembly must be consulted on Westminster bills which 
purport to: 
" confer new functions on the Assembly; 
" alter the Assembly's existing functions (including legislation on, for 
instance, freedom of information, which would affect the overall dis- 
charge of its duties and those public bodies for which it is responsible); or 
" otherwise affect areas which are the responsibility of the Assembly. 
including where it will otherwise be responsible for implementation in 
Wales, though policy control remains with the UK Government. 56 
Early identification of possible disagreements is fundamental; by the time 
any proposed legislation reaches the Cabinet's Legislative Programme 
s' DGN 9. nara 1. 
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committee (LP) to gain drafting authority and a commitment for 
parliamentary time, those issues need to have been addressed and, as far as 
possible, resolved. The approach is strikingly different to that outlined in 
DGN 10 on primary legislation for Scotland of a year earlier, indicating a 
more relaxed view about the practicalities of devolution a year on. 
DGN 8, Post-Devolution Primary Legislation affecting Northern Ireland, 
was published by the Cabinet Office in April 2001, and again stresses the 
importance of co-operation and early consultation. Bearing in mind the 
sensitive political climate in Northern Ireland it is not surprising that DGN 8 
is termed in much stronger language than its Welsh equivalent. While legis- 
lative proposals affecting Wales must be referred to the National Assembly, 
in Northern Ireland similar referrals must be made at the earlier policy stage. 
The DGN goes as far as to recommend that Whitehall departments should 
liaise with their Northern Ireland counterparts when `considering' legisla- 
tion on reserved matters (particularly on matters which may in the future be 
devolved). 
DGNs are complemented by Devolution in Practice: a checklist for offi- 
cials, agreed by members of the four UK administrations and issued in spring 
2001. The document offers a set of principles to be referred to by officials 
during their dealings between administrations and unsurprisingly 
emphasises communications, consultation and confidentiality. It comple- 
ments the values enshrined in the MOU and notes the importance of `effec- 
tive and efficient relationships between the administrations' to make the 
system work. " 
Remodelling the Centre 
To widespread surprise Blair embarked on a major re-organisation of the 
machinery of government in the wake of the UK general election. And he did 
not do the expected - despite all the discussion over the future of the territo- 
rial departments and their Secretaries of State, these were almost the only 
parts of central government to be left untouched. 
The change reached far and wide. One effect is that responsibility for 
constitutional affairs is now divided between just two Whitehall depart- 
ments: the Lord Chancellor's department and the Cabinet Office. While the 
transfer of human rights, freedom of information and data protection from 
the Home Office to the Lord Chancellor's department has left the former 
resembling a Ministry of the Interior, the latter seems to have taken on the 
role of a Ministry of Justice in all but name. 
The creation of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister following the 
general election heralds a potential strengthening at the centre of Whitehall. 
The appointment of John Prescott to the position of `Cabinet enforcer, ' a 
s' Available at: www. cabinet-office. go, *-. uk%constitution'devolution%devolution. htm 
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more significant figure than previous incumbents and supported by four 
ministers, " indicates an increased role for Prescott, not least with regard to 
devolution. Some of the responsibilities are relatively light; the Deputy 
Prime Minister (DPM) carries ministerial responsibility for the BIC and will 
deputise when necessary for the Prime Minister at meetings of the Council. 
As the Council has fallen into disuse during 2000 (see Chapter 7), this is 
unlikely to be onerous. More important is the fact that Prescott also chairs the 
new Cabinet Committee on the Nations and Regions (CNR)59 which replaces 
the former Devolution Policy (DP) committee chaired by Lord Irvine. CNR 
has broad terms of reference: `To consider policy and other issues arising 
from devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; and to develop 
policy on the English Regions. ' 
Prescott also has serious back-up in his new role. Following the general 
election the Constitution Secretariat has been remodelled and merged into a 
Devolution and Regions Division of the Cabinet Office's General Policy 
Group. While retaining general responsibility for managing devolution and 
its role as secretariat for the Joint Ministerial Committee on Devolution and 
BIC, the group will also be involved in the production of the White Paper on 
Regional Governance (and took over officials from the former DETR for 
this). Devolution has become a free-standing area incorporating aspects of 
policy on the English regions but separate from the (now largely completed) 
constitutional reform agenda. Like the Constitution Secretariat - the Devo- 
lution and Regions division will be involved primarily in the business of rela- 
tionships rather than policy, becoming involved when cross-administration 
issues are at stake, when information or advice on the devolution arrange- 
ments are requested, or when the Westminster legislative programme is 
involved, much as the Constitution Secretariat was. Added to this the DPM's 
responsibility for the Regional Co-ordination Unit and the nine Government 
Offices in the Regions, 2001 has seen a significant increase in the number of 
officials reporting to the Cabinet Office. 
With regard to regional government for England, no less than three depart- 
ments are involved (see also Chapter 5). The Government Offices for the 
Regions and the Regional Co-ordination Unit will report to the DPM in the 
Cabinet Office. Responsibility for the Regional Development Agencies has 
been transferred to Patricia Hewitt at the DTI, with only `regional policy' 
remaining at what is now the DTLR). Following this division of 
58 Barbara Roche MP, Christopher Leslie MP, Lord Macdonald ofTradeston and Baroness Morgan 
of Huyton. 
59 It is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and its other members are the Leader of the Commons. 
the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs; Work and Pensions; Transport, Local Government and the Regions; Health; Trade and 
Industry; Education and Skills; Culture, Media and Sport, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland; the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the Leader of the Lords, the Chief Whip, the Minister without Portfolio. 
the Attorney General, the Advocate General for Scotland, and the Minister of State at the Cabinet Office 
(Barbara Roche). The Foreign and Defence Secretaries also receive papers. 
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responsibility, press reports suggested that after having completed the forth- 
coming White Paper on English regional government Prescott would hand 
over the implementation of the policy to Stephen Byers in the DTLR. 
Regional Government was always going to be the subject of fierce Whitehall 
turf wars; this division of responsibility can only increase that risk. 
Daintith and Page observed in 1999 that, `The role of the centre is no 
longer confined to advice and assistance; it is also increasingly one of 
encouraging and exhorting departments and agencies to move in desired 
directions. X60 While the Constitution Secretariat concerned itself with the 
`management' of devolution here we may be seeing the development of a 
more active centre. One of the criticisms of the Constitution Secretariat was 
that, although it had a clear understanding of the decisions made by the 
devolved administrations, it was inherently reactive, and not strong enough 
to exert an influence on the ways in which departments worked .6' 
The 
remodelled centre may indeed prove to be a driving force behind policy on 
devolution to the nations and regions, if problems over the division of 
responsibility surrounding devolution to the English regions can be 
overcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Noreen Burrows has noted that in a country `whose constitutional mantra is 
that there is no written constitution, the deference to the written word in the 
devolution process is astonishing. '62 In addition to the primary legislation 
itself, there is secondary legislation, written codes and concordats. It is not so 
much that a formal written constitution is in the making, but that devolution 
has spawned a substantial written addition to `the set of laws, rules and prac- 
tices that create the basic institutions of the state and its component and 
related parts. '63 Within the text of concordats and DGNs alone we are seeing 
a codification of `the relationship[s] between the different institutions' of the 
state, a codification which may redefine the operation and study of the 
United Kingdom constitution in years to come. 64 
Nonetheless, Whitehall has accommodated devolution without too much 
difficulty. In large measure this is because devolution did not involve a new 
layer of government but changes in the accountability of an existing struc- 
ture. Whitehall has long understood that the component parts of the UK are 
treated differently, that the UK is a union, not a unitary state. Changes that 
have been introduced post-devolution have built on existing arrangements. 
60 Daintith and Page 1999, p385. 
61 Interviews with Whitehall officials, March 2001, July 2001. 
62 Burrows 2000, p2. 
63 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of 
Reference and Method of Working, 11 July 2001, HL 11, para 50. 
64 Ibid. 
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However, it remains early days. It is too early to say whether the growth of 
the `written word' suggests a 'carefully controlled process'65 or codification 
embodying a union state. 
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